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INTRODUCTION
Freedom of expression has long been considered a fundamental
right in the United States of America.' The liberty to speak one's
opinion' traditionally has been viewed as the pathway to the search
for "the truth"3 and a critical element of the pursuit of happiness.'
The post-modernist would conceptualize freedom of expression as one
important element of the individual's search to find his or her natural
place both within and independent from society, within him or herself.
The deconstructionist feminist perspective similarly holds freedom of
expression as the means by which we, as members of a community,
share beliefs, learn and grow, and pursue a rich and fulfilled life.'
t LL.M. Candidate, Georgetown University; J.D., University of Cincinnati;
B.A. Vassar College. The author served as an associate to the United States
delegation to the United Nations World Conference for Human Rights in Vienna,
Austria in 1993. She offers special thanks to Professor Gordon Christenson.
1. See Thomas Jefferson, The first Inaugural Address, cited in ,Vhitmny v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 n.2 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes, J.J., concurring):
If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this union or
change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of
the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated x.here reason is
left free to combat it.
Id.
2. For a discussion of the freedom to make false statements see Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3. Id. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LWERTY (1859).
4. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis and Holmes, J.J., concurring).
5. Susan H. Williams, Feminist Jurisprudence and Free Spechc Theory, 6S
TUL. L. REV. 1563, 1572 (1994).
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While these different views of free speech contain notable distinctions,
they all share a fundamentally positive opinion of the benefits and
importance of free expression.
The deconstructionist feminist and the Communist6 conceptions
of free speech share certain similarities insofar as free speech is
viewed as a good that must be subjected to some regulation by the
community, for the benefit of the whole.7 The Communist position
is that unrestricted free speech poses a potential danger to the state and
to the community. The feminist view, similarly, supports free speech
only insofar as it propels the advancement of the community and
particularly, as it affirmatively embraces the traditionally
disenfranchised sectors of the community.
8
Is free speech a fundamental right and inherent to all human
beings by virtue of the fact that they are human, as the traditional
American perspective maintains? Is it critical to the individual's sense
of self, both as an autonomous and social being, as asserted by
postmodern philosophy? Alternatively, is it fundamental in its
importance, but neither inherent to the individual nor universally
accessible, as the feminist perspective propounds? Or, is it neither
fundamental nor inherent as it is viewed in the Communist People's
Republic of China? This Article draws upon these four perspectives
and argues that free speech is both fundamental and inherent, and is
an integral part of the development and maintenance of the individual's
sense of self and personal dignity.
The argument begins with the premise that the individual is
paramount, and that the protection of his or her rights is superior to
the protection of society as a whole. However, it is important not to
view this individual as existing within a vacuum. He or she lives as
a member of a community and therefore, while protection of his or
her rights is the first priority, the protection of the life of the
6. This Article presents the Communist perspective of The People's Republic
of China. China is used as representative of Communism because It is one of the
last remaining operating communist countries and because of the great importance
of China in the world political and economic community.
7. Owen M. Fiss, Two Constitutions, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 492, 502-03
(1986).
8. See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993).
118 HYBRID
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol4/iss1/8
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
community as an organic whole must also be considered as part of the
free speech equation. Part I will examine, in greater depth, the four
perspectives of freedom of expression introduced above. Part II will
discuss the right to freedom of expression embodied in Article 19 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Part III will address the
proposition that freedom of expression is a fundamental and
inalienable right and should be protected across national boundaries.
Finally, the Article concludes that freedom of expression is an integral
element of human dignity and should not be subject to court or
government intervention.
I. FOUR PERSPECTIVES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A. The First Amendment Protection of Free Erpression
in the United States of America as Decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court
This section examines, in some depth, select opinions of Justices
Holmes, Brandeis and Brennan as representative of the traditional
American view of freedom of expression.
Justice Holmes, in his dissent in Abrams v. United States,9
asserted that the right to freedom of expression is at the very
foundation of our constitutional theory.u The expression of
competing ideas in the marketplace of ideas, stated Holmes, is the best
means of discovering the truth." The truth, furthermore, is at the
9. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Abrams was convicted under the Espionage Act for
publishing and distributing leaflets which disparaged the policies and actions of the
United States, declared the United States and all capitalist countries to be the 'true'
enemy and Russia to be the ally of the world's workers, and called for Russian
emigrants to "spit in the face of the false military propaganda" of the United States,
and to "make bullets not only for the Germans but also for the Workers Soviets of
Russia." Id. at 625.
10. Id. at 630.
11. Id. The Holmesian position of achieving truth by permitting ideas to
compete among themselves has had long endurance. In Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S.
323, 339-40 (1974), the Court found that opinions serve the purpose of truth
discovery and that the judicial system should stay out of the business of determining
the truth or falsity of an opinion. The Court wrote, '[hlowever parnicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and
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foundation of pursuit of the ultimate good, and pursuit of the ultimate
good is the theoretical framework of the Constitution.12 Therefore,
through free expression and the search for the truth, the "purpose" of
American liberty and democracy is realized:
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas -- that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the,
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution.13
Justice Holmes disputed the majority's position that the backdrop of
war should lessen the constitutional protection of free speech.
According to Justice Holmes, "[o]nly the emergency that makes it
immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time
warrants making any exception to the sweeping command, 'Congress
shall make no law . . abridging the freedom of speech."'"
Similarly, Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney
v. California," declared free expression to be the means to attain the
truth, and the truth to be at the foundation of liberty and happiness."
Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the State was to make men free to develop their
faculties; and that in its government the deliberative force;
should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty
both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to
be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of
liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth ....
juries but on the competition of other ideas." Id.
12. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 630-31.
15. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 375.
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Justice Brandeis maintained that open and vigorous discussion is
critically important to protect democratic freedom, and reasoned that
free speech and free assembly provide an "adequate protection" against
false or harmful ideas: "[W]ithout free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile. .. with them, discussion affords ordinary adequate
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine . . . the
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people. . . public discussion
is a political duty; and this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government."" Justice Brandeis conceded that "an
emergency can justify repression,"19 but qualified this by adding that
only an emergency could justify such repression.! ' Interestingly,
Justice Brandeis continued by stating that the privilege to declare an
emergency and enforce repression is the necessary counterpart to
freedom.21 In other words, in Justice Brandeis's conception of a free
and open society, liberty co-exists with a measure of repression and
free speech co-exists with and conquers false speech. Indeed, Justice
Brandeis maintained that the best weapon against false or harmful
speech is more speech: "If there be time to expose through discussion
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence. "2
Libel and defamation law in the United States also advances this
sentiment of the primacy of free speech and the protection of the
search for the truth. Justice Brennan in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan 3 asserted that debate on public issues must be protected,
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. "2 In protection of the truth,
in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, the Court held that
where the statement concerns a media defendant, liability will not be
18. Id.
19. Id. at 377.
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Justice Brandeis conceded: "Such must be the rule if authority is to be
reconciled with freedom." Id.
22. Id.
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. Id. at 270.
25. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
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found unless the statement can be proven false.26 In other words,
when the statement may be true, or when its truth cannot be
disproved, it will be protected under the First Amendment, regardless
of the harm it may cause to a public figure defendant.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,' the Supreme Court noted that
only where the content of speech is determined to be of "such slight
social value as a step to truth" may it be restrained in the interest of
"soc[iety], order and morality."2" The Chaplinsky decision permitted
the restraint of "fighting words," defined as "those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace, "29 while the Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton ° decision
permitted the restraint of expression considered to be obscene. An
ordinance, however, that prohibited placing an object or symbol on
public or private property, which would reasonably arouse anger or
otherwise cause distress to another individual on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender, was struck down by the Supreme
Court on constitutional grounds in R.A. V. v. St. Paul,3 despite the
fact that the message relayed was arguably of "slight social value."32
In the R.A. V. decision, the "search for truth" as a social value was
deleted from the equation of protecting "open and robust debate" for
the promotion of a free society, and no other value was substituted,
except perhaps a "slippery-slope" type of admonishment.33
26. Id. at 777.
27. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
28. Id. at 572.
29. Id.
30. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
31. 508 U.S. 377 (1992).
32. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
33. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARv. L. REv. 361 (1985).
The slippery slope argument, as described by Schauer, does not argue for the
inherent value of protecting the case currently under review, but, rather, rsserts that
if the current case does not receive protection, then who knows where this decision
not to protect will stop. Id. at 369. It is analogous to the snowball effect, where the
small snowball at the top of the hill is not dangerous, but the large mass that has
accumulated from the roll down the hill is, and further, once it begins downward,
it is difficult to tell at what point one must stop it in order to forestall the impending
danger. Similarly, in National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S.
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Similarly, restraints on pornographic expression face First
Amendment challenges based on whether they can be said to contain
"serious" social value.' This extraction of the truth or social value
from free expression protection leads to the rather empty shell of
expression protected for the sake of expression itself, rather than for
the purpose of an intrinsic or extrinsic value.
B. One Post-Modernist's Perspective of the Self
and Freedom of Erpression
This section analyzes the place of the self in society, using as its
43 (1977), which involved protecting the freedom of expression claim of a Nazi
group that wished to engage in a public demonstration in the town of Skokie, where
the majority of the audience had been formerly persecuted by the Nazis during
World War II, the Court appeared to be more concerned with a 'slippery slopes"
threat to freedom of expression rather than any inherent social value of Nazis
speaking their minds to the population of Skokie. The Court effectively queried
where censorship would end if the government prohibited the Nazi Party from
relating its message because of its content. Schauer notes that most freedom of
expression challenges that rise to the point of litigation involve fringe, or apparently
noxious, individuals or groups, lead to the natural human inclination to over-restrain
the patently offensive, rather than to prohibit, in a neutral manner. This tendency
to over-restrain, thus, lends fuel to the flame (or snow to the snowball, as the case
may be) of the slippery slope argument. Schauer, supra at 377.
Even as society has internalized the values of free speech in abstract form,
the particular applications of the principle of free speech remain
counterintuitive to most people. Jurors, for example, are not called upon
to consider and defend the free speech rights of Bob Hope or Billy
Graham. Rather, they are asked to protect those who are unpopular, such
as the Hare Krishnas and the Jehovah's Witnesses, and those who are
simply wicked, including the Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan. The
decisionmaker's negative view of the parties is likely to lead to mistakes
of a particular kind, to oversuppression rather than undersuppression, in
the application of free speech principles, and these mistakes serve to
create the special slippery slope danger.
Id. See also Frederick Schauer, Codifing the First Anicndnent: New IYork v.
Ferber, 19S2 SuP. CT. REv. 285, 315-16; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation
and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 225 (1983); Frederick
Schauer, Free Speech and the Denise of the Soapbox, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 558, 566
(1984) (book review), cited in Schauer, Slippety Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. at 377.
34. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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principle source Roberto Mangabeira Unger's essay Passion.3"
Unger constructs a new place for the individual within society and
thereby rescues the modern autonomous individual from the spiritual
island of social iconoclasm.36 The Holmesian individual, by contrast,
seems to have very little substantive connection with his fellow man.
His freedom of expression metaphorically exists as a battling soldier
against the words of others, and through the nonviolent combat of the
open and robust debate the truth is attained as an entity apart from
those who utter it.37
Under the Holmesian view, to be truly free, the individual must
dispute the conventional, cast off the yoke of the established, and
search for the genuine truth as a thing separate from the institution of
society. The truth is the good to be attained, unique to the
individual's personal perception. Yet the marketplace in which this
skirmish takes place is, of course, society and the result -- the
production of the human good -- itself nourishes and sustains the
community.
Unger returns the autonomous individual to the community and
re-creates the place for individual passion within the continuum of
autonomy in conflict with social acceptance. Unger argues that
personal passion, which is unshackled by social convention and
essential to the quest for freedom, must exist as a counterpart to the
human need for acceptance and support by a stable community. 8
One facet cannot exist without the other: the wild and the free need
the solid structure of society, just as society needs passions in order
for it to remain free and vital. However, existing social constructs are
found by the passionate soul to be ever-inadequate and requiring
change. It is through this dialectic, of sorts, that some balance of
public and private freedom is attained. According to Unger:
We face two overriding problems. One is that the
requirements of self-assertion conflict. The other is that
though we must settle down to particular contexts, no
35. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY
(1984).
36. See generally id.
37. See generally Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissentlng).
38. UNGER, supra note 35, at 104.
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contexts in particular do justice to our desires and
capabilities. We understand ourselves by discovering the
unsuspected ways in which these two problems get
implicated in each other. We empower ourselves by
holding on to both sides of these dilemmas and by
inventing, through forms of life and stratagems of
imagination, the freedom that is possible despite their
insolubility and because of their insolubility."
Free expression is again the means by which truth is attained, but here
a truth integral to the vitality of the individual as an active yet free
participant in society.
C. The Feminist Deconstructionist Perspective of
Freedom of Ex'pression
Feminist deconstructionists question the validity of this protection
of words and expressive actions in the absence of the protection of
values, individuals, or the community. Truth as a distinct value again
fuses with the concept of justifying the protection of freedom of
expression. However, truth from this perspective is not viewed as an
objective, higher reality discovered through the process of battling
truths, lesser truths, and non-truths. Rather, truth is a shared
experience, "evaluative and perspectival"4" based on the opinions of
the individuals who espouse it, and "constructed "4 out of the views
of the community. Truth, thus, as a shared experience and a mutually
discovered condition, possesses value because it is the natural result
of the coming together of diverse views and the essential foundation
for a living, growing, functioning community.42 Truth is the creature
born of the social condition of living, working, speaking, and acting
together.
ITiruth and knowledge grow out of and form the basis for
a shared social life .... Without a process of knowledge
formation, a society could not long sustain the shared life
on which so much depends. . . . Speech is one of the
39. Id. at 193.
40. Williams, supra note 5, at 1572.
41. Id. at 1572-74.
42. Id. at 1572.
19971
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1997
[Vol. 4:117
ways in which we can construct this new kind of tru,,h
together. Listening to the speech of others makes us more
aware of the diversity of views and the limitations of our
own perspectives, provides an opportunity to learn
openness on all levels, and gives us the materials for self-
criticism. Our own speech allows us to contribute to this
process of cultural construction and actually to practice
honest self-criticism. . . . Indeed, this model of dialogue
- in which the participants come together to create zn
understanding that neither possessed alone - surely is one
of the great hopes and promises of speech.43
If truth is the creature of our shared, communal experience, then
necessarily, all members of the community must have an equal
opportunity to participate in its creation, otherwise truth will be flawed
and expression neither will be genuinely protected nor free. Catharine
MacKinnon notes that in a society such as our own, "some people get
a lot more speech than others." '  That is, where injustices and
inequality persist, free expression is available only to those who are
among the politically powerful. This social condition excludes the
oppressed or subjugated groups, including women and racial
minorities. Indeed, protecting free speech of those among the
politically empowered without likewise ensuring access to free
expression to those along the periphery or among the disenfranchised
tends to aggravate social injustices and subjugate further the politically
alienated or oppressed, thus creating a very lopsided condition of far
less than universal free speech. MacKinnon asserts that if access to
public speech media was open to all, and speech, therefore, genuinely
was free, then the injustices and inequalities existent in society might
be exposed for what they are, and suppressing expression would no
longer be protected under the guise of free speech.
If speech were seen through an equality lens, nude
dancing regulations might be tailored to ending the sex
inequality of prostitution, at the same time undermining
the social credibility of the pimp's lie that public sex is
how women express themselves. Crossburnlng
prohibitions would be seen as the civil rights protections
43. Williams, supra note 5, at 1572.
44. MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 72.
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they are. Women might be seen to have a sex equality
right to the speech of abortion counseling. Poverty might
even be seen as the inequality underlying street begging,
at once supporting the speech interest in such solicitations
and suggesting that equal access to speech might begin
before all one can say is "spare change? ""
MacKinnon's utopian image, thus, expands free expression to include
access by all persons, and views truth as the amalgamation of all
competing viewpoints, rather than the "sanitized " "4 or objectified
version held by traditional free speech theorists.
The feminist view of free speech seeks to embrace all people in
society in the search for some form of shared, yet evolving, truth.
Such an approach would advance not only the freedom of the
individual, but also the interests of society as a whole. Individual free
expression would be ensured, but in a reciprocal and mutually
supportive relationship with the community. The Communist
perspective on free speech, by contrast, assigns absolute priority to the
well-being of the community, and in so doing, sacrifices individual
freedom of expression.
D. The Conmmunist View of a Right to Free Speech
In the Communist society of the People's Republic of China, free
speech may exist only so far as it serves the interests of the
community.47 Under the 1982 Constitution, Article 35 states that,
"Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech,
of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of
demonstration."n However, all individual rights, including the right
to free speech, are qualified by Article 51, which asserts the
unequivocal priority of group interests over individual rights: "The
exercise of citizens of the People's Republic of China of their
45. Id. at 85-86.
46. Id. at 77.
47. For a more in-depth discussion of Communist China's distinct perceptions
of personal freedoms and human rights, see Mlanne Andromecca Civic,
International and Chinese Human Rights: Universality Versus Cultural Relativism,
2 BUFFALO J. INT'L L. 285 (1995).
48. XIANFA IConstitutionl (1982) art. 35. (P.R.C.).
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freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state,
of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and
rights of other citizens. '41 All individual rights are restricted
additionally by the requirements of Article 54: "It is the duty of
citizens of the People's Republic of China to safeguard the security,
honour and interest of the motherland; they must not commit acts
detrimental to the security, honour and interests of the motherland. "'0
In practice, free speech in China is that which remains after one has
taken into account all of the interests of the community. Speech and
other forms of expression must be internally, as well as externally,
restrained to serve all of the people. Professor Owen Fiss reveals the
qualitative scope of free speech under the Chinese Constitution:
In China, even under the new constitution, free speech
appears as a residue; it remains after we have reached the
outer boundary of the statute (or other form of law).
Article 35 tells citizens what they might do, but is not a
restriction on the power of the state. They are allowed to
engage in speech that is lawful. 51
Thus, the Chinese perception of free speech in particular, and human
rights in general, is propelled by Communist ideology which
emphasizes the interests of the community at the expense of individual
interests. Finally, the "rights" of the individual are defined relative
to his duties to the community, and are subject to qualification,
restriction and repression for community interests, as defined by the
Communist Party elite.52
49. Id. art. 51.
50. Id. art. 54. This provision has been invoked by the governmett to justify
the suppression of democratic demonstration, including the Tiananmen Square
incident in 1989, as counter-revolutionary acts creating threats to the security, honor
and interests of the country. See generally Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., Why
Impose Martial Law in Beijing, June 21, 1989; Brit. Broadcasting Corp., Peking
CCP Discusses Recent Turmoil and Reasons for Martial Law, BBC SUMMARY Op
WORLD BROADCASTS, June 5, 1989, at FE/0474/B211 (full text translation of
Propaganda Dep't of the Beijing Mun. CCP Comm., Recognise the Essence of
Turmoil and the Necessity of Martial Law, XINHUA NEWs StRv., May 29, 1989).
51. Fiss, supra note 7, at 497.
52. See XtANFA [Constitution] (1982) arts. 51, 54; see also Fiss, supra note
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The search for the truth is neither an objectified marketplace of
competing ideas, as in the Holmesian model, nor a shared community
experience as in the feminist deconstructionist approach. Rather, the
"search" for "truth" takes the form of the espousal of the appointed
truth -- the propagation of the party line as it is the dominant belief
system. Competing viewpoints not only are not explored, they are
suppressed and are expected to be repressed.
In a sense, the Chinese Communist approach can be characterized
as an extremist version of MacKinnon's equality model and one which
tramples over any expression of individuality and destroys the integrity
of personal freedom. This model of equality, an artificial construct of
the ruling elite, attempts to stamp out competing ideas, enforce
uniformity, and dictate a prescribed "truth," which is in stark contrast
to the feminist view of equal access to and universal opportunity for
free expression within a society, or the Post-Modernist perspective of
the individual in a conflicting, yet mutually reinforcing, relationship
with society.
II. ARTICLE 19 AND WHAT IT PURPORTS TO PROTECT
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "3
states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression;
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers." -4  Article 19 appears to describe a
comprehensive individual right to freedom of expression. It covers
not only speech, but also other forms of expression, as well as the
receiving and imparting of information or ideas on any topic, in any
form by means of any method and within and between all nations."
This right may be viewed as a right genuinely held by the
individual. "Everyone," the first word of Article 19, encompasses all
persons and makes no distinctions based on citizenship, gender, race,
age, profession, etc. The next phrase, "has the right," includes no
53. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. Doe. AIS10, at 71 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration].
54. Id. art. 19.
55. Id.
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qualifications as to how the right is obtained and thereby indicates the
inherent nature of the right. Re-assembling the phrase, "Evryone has
the right .. " means, therefore, that all persons possess; the right
within them, that their nation does not award them the right, and even
the international community is not the giver of the right. As one is
human, one has the right of freedom of expression regardless of where
one lives and regardless of the medium by which one chooses to
exercise the right. This is the broad scope of freedom of expression
that Article 19, standing alone, appears to guarantee.
However, Article 19 is not an entirely unrestrained freedom. As
was noted at the Sixth International Symposium on the European
Human Rights Convention and Freedom of Expression: "no
democratic society has yet removed the obstacles to full freedom of
expression, and it is improbable that any will do so in the near
future."56 Article 19 must be read in conjunction with, and in the
context of, Article 2911 which limits rights where they are in direct
conflict with group interests, but only to the extent necessary to
preserve the rights of others. Specifically, Article 29 states that:
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone
the free and full development of his personality is
possible.
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone
shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined
by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of
meeting the just requirements of morality, public order
and the general welfare in a democratic society.
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
56. Danilo Tdrk & Louis Joinet, The Right to Freedom of Expression: Current
Problems of Its Realization and Measures Necessary for Its Strength and Promotion,
Excerpts from the Update of the Preliminary Report Prepared for the U.N. Sub-
Committee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991, July 9, 1991, in STRIKNG A BALANCE 35, 38 (Sandra
Coliver ed. 1992) (quoting Lord McGregor of Durris, President of the Advertising
Standards Authority of London, at the Sixth International Symposlum on the
European Human Rights Convention and Freedom of Expression).
57. Universal Declaration, supra note 53, art. 29.
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Nations.53
In cultures that value group rights over individual rights, Article 29
has been interpreted broadly, essentially eviscerating Article 19. At
the United Nations World Conference for Human Rights," the
community of international non-governmental organizations expressed
concern that phrases, such as the one which appears in Article 29(2):
"everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined
by law . . ."I may and indeed have been interpreted with a low
emphasis on the word "only" and great emphasis on "as determined"
by law" and on the policing rights of the state." The result is that
individual nations have asserted that they have the right to determine
through their own laws the extent to which freedom of expression may
be curtailed for the protection of public order, morality and the
general welfare, as interpreted domestically by their culture and
community.
According to the London-based nongovernmental organization,
Article XIX, such an interpretation runs counter to the original intent
of the framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, 3 and of the
more recent re-examinations and re-evaluations by U.N. Special
Rapporteurs.M The more accurate interpretation is that states have
authority to pass laws which limit freedom of expression only for the
purpose of the protection of racial, ethnic or other minorities, and only
to the extent necessary to achieve this goal." It is necessary, at
58. Id.
59. United Nations World Conference for Human Rights, Vienna, Austria,
June 14-24, 1993 [hereinafter World Conference].
60. Universal Declaration, supra note 53, art. 29(2).
61. At several briefing sessions held by the United States delegation for the
non-governmental organizations, this was a consistent concern voiced by non-
governmental organization representatives.
62. Universal Declaration, supra note 53.
63. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 22, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force on Mar. 23,
1976 [hereinafter ICCPRI.
64. See generally Tfirk and Joinet, supra note 56.
65. Id. at 6.
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times, to "strike a balance" between the freedom of expression
imperative and the interests of minorities who often need special
protections in order to attain the same level of freedom as the majority
group.6" This balance does not permit a carte blanche derogation of
the right, indeed, bald derogation would drastically tip the scales away
from a balance of any kind.67
In 1990, two Special Rapporteurs prepared a preliminary
report,6" as requested by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities [hereinafter the Sub-
Commission]69 for the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
[hereinafter the Commission],7" which was a re-examination of the
right to freedom of opinion and expression as described by Article 19
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights71 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.72 In 1992, the report was
updated and presented to the Commission. The updated report
contains two observations which are particularly relevant here.
First, the Rapporteurs "categorically confirm[ed] that freedom of
66. Note the similarities here with the feminist deconstructionist argument.
See supra Part H.C.
67. Case law of the European Court of Human Rights supports this balancing
proposition:
[On the one hand... freedom of expression constitutes one of the basic
foundations of a democratic society, one of the prime conditions for its
progress and for the full development of every individual; on the other
hand it also emphasizes that freedom of expression may come up against
the exercise of other freedoms and . . . it may not always be easy to set
the fundamental rights and freedoms of the person in order of
importance.
Tiirk & Joinet, supra note 56, para. 14, at 37.
68. Id.
69. The U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities is a subsidiary body of the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights and consists of 26 experts, nominated by their own governments, but serving
in their individual capacities as experts. Id. at 35.
70. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights consists of 53 government
representatives which reports to the General Assembly through the Economic and
Social Council. Id.
71. Universal Declaration, supra note 53.
72. ICCPR, supra note 63.
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expression . . . constitutes a fundamental right. ""' Second, the
report clarified the place of Article 29(2) in the implementation of
Article 19:
[E]ven when provided for by the law, a restriction is
permissible only if it has in view one of the objects
limitatively enumerated by the texts concerned. It is
noteworthy that the wider a law is, the less its constitutive
elements are defined, the more difficult it is to monitor
respect for this second criterion which one could call
"legitimacy," and the easier it is for a State to claim to
have one of these objectives in view or to divert laws
from the objective which they claim to pursue. From this
point of view, the control of legitimacy is far from
illusory; it is the natural extension of that of legality.'
Thus, a restriction imposed on the fundamental right to free expression
must be (1) provided by law, (2) designed expressly to carry out the
purposes permitted under Article 29(2), and only those purposes, and
to pass the test of legitimacy, (3) the law should be narrowly tailored
to address specifically one of these permissible purposes. '
III. WHY DEFEND A RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION
ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES?
If freedom of expression is integral to human dignity, then
protecting it, not only in our own nation, but across national
boundaries -- in all places where human beings reside and against all
forces, governmental or otherwise -- is a human and a world
community imperative. The next section further explores the
proposition that freedom of expression is a fundamental and
inalienable right.
A. Is Freedom of Eypression a Fundamental and/or
Inalienable Right?
Western cultures tend to view the set of rights articulated in the
73. Tirk & Joinet, supra note 56. para. 6. at 37.
74. Id. para. 41 at 40.
75. See generally Ttrk and Joinet, supra note 56, at 40.
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights,76 as, at minimum, both
fundamental and inalienable. These rights are those that were set
down by a core group of the original member states of the United
Nations, including representatives from Australia, Chile, Nationalist
China, France, Lebanon, the United States, the United Kingdom and
the Soviet Union. According to John Humphrey, the first Director of
the United Nations Division of Human Rights, the final draft was
substantially Western-influenced and was essentially a "combinlationi
of humanitarian liberalism with social democracy." 7 The Western
view of rights is derived principally from natural law theory which is
founded upon classical ethics and Judeo-Christian morality.7"
As the demonstration of the fundamental and inalienable nature
of these rights, the Preambles of both the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights79 and the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights' assert human dignity as the basis for the rights set forth in
the respective documents: "... these rights derive from th- inherent
dignity of the person...., 1 Some prominent human rights scholars
also maintain that human dignity is the foundation of all fundamental
human rights.82
Freedom of expression is articulated in Article 19 of both of these
documents and, therefore, the dignity claim asserted in the Preambles
applies to freedom of expression. Of course, this piece of evidence
is not sufficient to prove that the very sense of our human dignity
requires that we enjoy the "right to freedom of opinion and
76. Universal Declaration, supra note 53.
77. JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A
GREAT ADVENTURE 8 (1984).
78. See A. P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCION TO LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 51-64 (1970).
79. Universal Declaration, supra note 53, pmbl.
80. ICCPR, supra note 63, pmbl.
81. Universal Declaration, supra note 53, pmbl.; ICCPR, supra note 63, pnibl.
82. See generally Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Human Dignity: An
Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AMI. PoL. Scl.
REV. 303 (1982); Rhoda E. Howard and Jack Donnelly, Human Dign/ty, Human
Rights and Political Regimes, 80 AM. POL. Sc!. REv. 801, 801-17 (1986).
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expression, " 3 but it does provide some relevant evidence of the
intent of the framers of these documents, as long as it can be assumed
that the diverse group of nations who were involved in the drafting all
shared a universal sense of what was meant by the phrase "dignity of
the person."' That assumption is not necessarily valid, because
from a culturally relativistic perspective, human dignity may be seen
not only as a personal experience, exclusively attainable within the
individual, but also, alternatively, as a shared experience achieved
through participation in the community, or as a state of existence of
the community, as a description of a well-functioning political state.
As touched upon above, some cultures and philosophical systems
find neither individual rights in general, nor the right to freedom of
expression in particular, either fundamental or inalienable or
necessarily founded upon personal human dignity."5 Indeed, we have
seem that some nations view individual rights as privileges, rather than
rights, awarded by and under the regulation of the state. Human
dignity is not specifically recognized as an individual claim, rather, the
collective dignity of the community is principally at issue, and
personal dignity may be achieved through a dignified body polity.
Personal dignity, according to this perspective, is one after-effect
where rights and duties imposed by the state preserve the well-being
of the state.
The Chinese priority of group interests over individual rights, for
example leads to a preference for group-oriented rights and privileges,
which generally include subsistence economic rights, as well as social
and cultural rights. 6 This preference is asserted conceptually
83. Universal Declaration, supra note 53, art. 19.
84. Id.
85. John O'Manique defines inalienability as regards human rights to b-. "a
right that exists by virtue of the right-holder's existence. It is not created or granted
by some agent and therefore cannot be taken away by such an agent.' John
O'Manique, Universal and Inalienable Rights; A Scarch for Foundations, 12 HL",.
RTS. Q. 465, 467 (1990).
86. For a catalogue of group-oriented rights as recognized by the international
community, see the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S., entered into force on Jan. 3, 1976.
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through the considered importance of the right or privilege in
question, determines the time-line for the nation's attempts at
implementation of the particular right or privilege, and indeed
disparages the protection of individual rights in general. China and
some African nations have maintained that economic and social rights
serve their national interest and that their implementation must take
priority over political rights concerns.' In other words, speech or
expression cannot be permitted to be free under the law of these
nations, if and where free speech interferes with the state's attempt to
promote its policies of economic reform for the general welfare."
The dominant Western viewpoint, by contrast, as represented by
the United States, asserts that if any right or group of rights must be
implemented sequentially, then freedom of expression and the other
political rights must take priority over economic, social, or cultural
rights. These priority and implementation issues are the crux of the
debate of cultural relativism89 which relates back to the question of
human dignity.'
Scholars in the fields of politics, philosophy, law and human
87. See generally Human Rights in an East Asian Perspective, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN EAST ASIA (James C. Hsiung ed. 1985); Info. Office of the State Council
of the People's Republic of China, Human Rights in China, BEuING REV., Nov. 4-
10, 1991, at 34 (articulating China's official position on human rights); Rep. of the
Regional Meeting of the World Conference on Human Rights [The Tunis
Declaration], U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., at 1-3, U.N. Doc. AICONF.1571AFRMI14
(1992).
88. Where political institutions are either weak or so new to the culture that
they are ineffective, political participation normally means social chaos. Distribution
of subsistence is made more difficult, if not impossible by such social chaos. Once
economic development is attained and all people are fed, clothed, have a job and a
place to live, then the priority may possibly shift to political rights and institution-
building, depending upon the particular circtumstances of the nation. According to
the "fall-belly" thesis, a man's belly must be full before lie can indulge in the
"luxury" of worrying about his political freedoms. Rhoda Howard, The Full-Belly
Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political Rights?
Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 467, 469 (1983).
89. See generally id.; Jack Donnelly, CulturalRelativism and Universal Human
Rights, 6 HuM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984).
90. For a more in-depth discussion of cultural relativism, see Civic, supra note
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rights have debated the culturally relativistic approach to human ri-hts.
The general argument in support of cultural relativism maintains that
an individual nation should have the prerogative of prioritizing rights
in a manner appropriate to its culture and political and economic
circumstances. 91
Rhoda Howard patently refutes the validity of cultural relativism
and denies the proposition that economic rights should, or even can,
be implemented before political rights.2 She notes that without
political rights there exist no checks on government to ensure the
equitable distribution of the products of economic development.
Additionally, Howard asserts that "psychological sustenance," as
distinct from physical sustenance, requires that citizens feel a sense of
personal dignity and individual control or influence over their own
lives. 93 This human dignity, according to Howard, can be guaranteed
only through civil and political human rights.
At first glance, Howard's argument appears to support a cultural
relativism which favors political over economic rights, but upon a
closer look one can see that she is stating that the cultural relativist
claim that economic rights must be achieved prior to the
implementation of political rights, threatens the integrity of all rights.
Thus, Howard states, "suspension of civil and political rights in these
countries until after economic development has been achieved will in
effect mean that neither development nor rights will be attained.""
Human dignity is at the heart of human rights and human existence,
and political rights, operating in concert with economic rights, are
essential to achieving this sense of dignity.
Indeed, the experience of the United States during the 1950s
through the 1970s and the Johnson and Nixon administrations' "war
on poverty," 95 underscores Howard's thesis. During the 1950s, the
91. See Donnelly, supra note 82.
92. See generally Howard, supra note 88. But see Donnelly, supra note 82.
93. Howard, supra note 88.
94. Id. at 468.
95. President Lyndon Johnson coined the phrase "War on Poverty,' as a pillar
of his Great Society reforms. The American Experience, The War on Poverty (PBS
television broadcast, Jan. 16-18, 1995). In his January 1964 State of the Union
Message. President Lyndon Johnson said the following:
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U.S. was the most economically prosperous nation in the world and
yet it contained a large and growing underclass of severely poor
individuals, many of whom could not even afford sufficient food,
clothing or housing to meet their most basic needs. African American
persons, for example, continued to face discrimination in access to
work or in securing suitable wages and many were among the
unemployed or the working poor.96
During the 1950s, a civil rights movement took form which, in
the 1960s, began to demand economic freedom and equal opportunity.
During the 1960s and 1970s, individuals organized and protested for
a right to a basic subsistence wage to be guaranteed by the government
and to a right to welfare. Some progress was made, and much more
needs to be made, but the principal point of this paper is not to
critique adequacy of the social reforms, but rather is to note that
organizing and protests, picketing, sit-ins, speaking to the press and
other media, and finally, achieving the goal of having some people in
the broader society and in government take notice and actually do
something in response, were only possible because of the constitutional
right to freedom of expression. Changing the shortcomings of the
social system and improving the problems of poverty began with the
right of the afflicted and their supporters to speak out and try to make
themselves heard.
In the absence of free speech rights, the poverty conditions may
have led alternatively either to the creation of a permanent and
complacent underclass and a public health and welfare tragedy, or a
violent revolution. Of course, freedom of expression is not always
enough to change social policy, particularly where those in power
Let this session of Congress be known as the session which did more for
civil rights than the last hundred sessions combined ... as tie session
which declared all-out war on human poverty and unemployment in these
United States .... this and more can and must be done.
Cited in FRANK FREIDEL, OUR COUNTRY'S PRESIDENTs 240 (1966).
96. Other examples include the residents of the Pennsylvania and West
Virginia coal towns of the Appalachian mountains, many of whom becane
economically displaced with industry's shift away from the use of coal.
Additionally, the expanded mechanization of many industries left large numbers of
persons "obsolete" in the work force and without work. The American Experience,
supra note 95.
HYBRID
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol4/iss1/8
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
refuse to hear. The right to speak out does not mean a guarantee to
be heard. Particularly troubling is the fact that in the past twenty-five
years, many in power have ignored the protests of those who advocate
rights for the poor or failed to act upon the problems of poverty
completely and comprehensively to the point that the creation of a
permanent underclass or a revolution may yet be the end result.
Nevertheless, such an underclass is not, and need never be,
complacent -- it can continue to voice its protests and someone in
power will eventually take notice and take action, even if only
motivated by the desire to quiet the protests.
Furthermore, in the absence of free expression rights, even if
action had been taken on the issue of poverty, as in the above
example, the afflicted persons would not and could not have played
any role in the making of policy because they and their opinions would
have been removed from the social policy equation. Then, the
proposed solutions would have been based entirely upon another
person's or group's beneficence and this other entity's decision. 7
Does not personal dignity demand that one play a role in major
decisions that affect his or her life?
The culturally relativistic approach to human rights was formally
rejected and universality was adopted by the world community in its
place at the 1993 United Nations World Conference for Human
Rights.9" Universality, among its other tenants, views freedom of
expression, as well as all of the rights articulated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights," to be universally applicable,
regardless of culture, to all people, regardless of national origin or
state citizenship, by virtue of their being human, and considers each
97. The belief that it is not "right" or that it compromises human dignity to
allow others to decide important issues for us is at the very foundation of dmo-ratic
theory. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Paris Adult T7icatre, noted the dangers that
arise even where die state is permitted to decide that expression considered obscene
may be suppressed, because once the state is given such a power over personal
expression, "lilt is hard to see how state-ordered regimentation of our minds can
ever he forestalled. 413 U.S. 49. 110 (1973).
98. World Conference, supra note 59.
99. Universal Declaration, supra note 53.
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of these rights to be of universal and equivalent importance." '
Furthermore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,""t
describes the minimum level of compliance.10 2  As stated in the
Vienna Declaration:
All human rights are universal, indivisible and inter-
dependent and inter-related. The international community
must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal
manner in the same footing, and with the same emphasis.
While the significance of national and regional
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of
states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural
systems, to promote and protect all human rights and
fundamental freedoms. 103
Additionally, where international norms and national standards are in
100. The universality construct consists of four elements. Professor Vitit
Muntarbhor, The Universality of Standards, Lecture for 24th Study Session, July
2-30, 1993, Rene Cassin International Institute of Human Rights (notes on file with
author). Universality condemns the practice of prioritizing human rights within a
country or community, and particularly disdains the repression or exclusion of one
or another "generation" of rights. Id. The different "generations" oF rights are
generally considered to be: (1) civil and political; (2) economic, social ad cultural;
and (3) rights of solidarity. See Philip Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity
Right: Progressive Developnent or Obfuscation of International Hunlan Rights Law?,
29 NErH. INT'L L. REv. 307, 321 (1982); see generally Louis B. Solin, The New
International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM.
U. L. REV. 1 (1982). O'Manique describes universality as the
practical conclusion to [the inalienability of human rights] ., that rights
are not creations of society, state, or any political authority, legitimate
or not, and therefore cannot be limited or removed by them. If this were
the case it would follow that all humans have rights in the same way and
to the same extent regardless of their race, culture, political system or
any other distinction. In other words, human rights would be universal.
O'Manique, supra note 85, at 467.
101. Universal Declaration, supra note 53.
102. Muntarbhorn, supra note 100.
103. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 157/23, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna,
Austria, June 25, 1993, sec. 1, para. 3.
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direct conflict, the international standards must prevail." Finally,
it is the duty of the international community to enforce international
human rights, and such enforcement must not be considered an
unlawful intrusion on domestic sovereignty.'
What this means for freedom of expression internationally is that
all nations, regardless of culture or political circumstances, are faced
with the imperative of honoring and enforcing a right to freedom of
expression within their own countries and within all other countries.
Of the 180 nations that attended the World Conference and debated
over the drafting stage of the Vienna Declaration, all participants
approved the final document and, therefore, all 180 nations are
morally bound to uphold the universality principle.'
In summary, history has shown that personal dignity precedes and
is at the foundation of human rights and individual human rights are
at the foundation of community dignity and are critical to the proper
functioning of the community. Still, regardless of the culturally
relativistic interpretations formerly attributed to the meaning of the
term human dignity and in the definition and position of human rights
in a given culture; at present, the universality principle demands that
the human rights articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights 7  be recognized and embraced as fundamental and
inalienable. Whether or not human dignity is perceived as a personal
or community experience, it does appear to lie at the heart of all
nations' claims of both the granting and imposition of rights and
duties. Whichever route one takes to arrive at the destination of
rights, privileges, or duties, one can find dignity, in one form or
another, as a critical guiding principle.
104. Muntarbhorn, supra note 100.
105. Id.
106. However, it is important to note that the Vienna Declaration, like all
United Nations declarations, is not a legally binding document and is merely a
morally persuasive declaration of principles. Additionally, in tie face of unanimous
approval, many of the nations that approved the document also registered formal
reservations and disagreement with select words or passages.
107. Universal Declaration, supra note 53.
19971
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1997
[Vol. 4:117
IV. CONCLUSION
Where does all this leave us? What of the Communist position
which asserts that no "rights" are inherent or inalienable and that free
expression will be regulated and may exist only so far as it benefits
the community? And what of the feminist deconstructionist position
that maintains that the right to freedom of expression, while correctly
an inherent right of the individual, is not inalienable, and exists for the
purpose of improving the shared social experience of life and the
community? Who can say that the individual should be more
important than the community, and that personal dignity and free
expression are not only inter-connected, but in fact are integral to the
personal and emotional integrity of the human being; or, as Justices
Holmes and Brandeis maintained, such ideals are integral to the search
for truth on the path to happiness and the "good life" -- the moral and
fulfilled life?
C. S. Lewis offers one argument. According to the tenants of
Christianity, human beings live forever in the sense that they possess
an immortal soul. No community or nation can claim greater
importance than the individual human being because all communities
or nations exist only for a moment in comparison with the individual's
"forever. "108
Christianity asserts that every individual human being i s
going to live for ever . . . . If individuals live only
seventy years, then a state, or a nation, or a civilisation,
which may last for a thousand years, is more Important
than an individual. But if Christianity is true, then the
individual is not only more important but incomparably
more important, for he is everlasting and the life of a state
or a civilisation, compared with his, is only a
moment. 109
Regardless of whether one is Christian, this argument cuts at the heart
of the debate over a right to freedom of expression: the tension
between the right and dignity of the individual versus the well-being
of the state.
In the United States we choose the individual over the state so
108. C. S. LEwIs, MERE CIMSTIANrry 73 (1952).
109. Id.
HYBRID
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol4/iss1/8
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
that the autonomy of the individual to be free from government
restraint is paramount. The individual must be free to express him or
herself and to participate as a vital member of the democratic society.
However, the individual's interest in autonomy, when taken to an
extreme, can become a danger to the national interest and the
community good. This is because the individual, who has the freedom
to choose, can exercise his or her freedoms for the good of himself or
herself and for the good of the community, or he or she can exercise
freedom selfishly, for the purposes of hedonism or personal greed.
When the individual, whose freedoms are protected by the First
Amendment or Article 19, pursues hedonistic goals, for example, for
the purpose of profiting from the production of pornographic materials
or for the purpose of selfishness or fear or hate, as with the expression
of racist opinions, and when that individual has little or no regard for
the good of the community, then all of society suffers and the free
expression right begins to be gutted of its substantive value.
Ultimately, like a lung without air, democratic society, unsupported
by the autonomous and free, but instead, the hedonistic and greedy,
may itself approach destruction. As Charles Taylor notes, "the
individual has been taken out of a rich community life and now enters
instead into a series of mobile, changing, revocable associations, often
designed merely for highly specific ends. We end up relating to each
other through [a] series of partial roles.""' These partial roles by
which we now relate to each other diminishes each of us as it
diminishes society as a whole.
Therefore, naked freedom of expression, without some common
sense or good community sense infused into it, ultimately will fail to
protect the individual as a member of the community, by its total
disregard for the needs of the society. Personal dignity will not be
supported if the individual must fight and claw for a safe haven in an
otherwise obliquely autonomous and self-serving culture. Thus, while
freedom of expression is essential to human dignity, additionally, for
the ultimate good of the individual as a member of society, such
freedom must be exercised responsibly and with a recognition of the
integral relationship the autonomous self has with the greater society.
110. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: TIE MAKING OF MODERN2
IDENTrTY 502 (1989).
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Thomas Mann's Magic Mountain... which tells the story of a
man who is entirely self-involved and unitarily focused on fiercely
preserving his personal autonomy and freedom provides an illustration
of this point. The main character gradually disintegrates, falling into
a mental depression and obsession, with his own thoughts and beliefs.
As he attempts to find the cure in a sanitarium along with other
similarly afflicted individuals, his world is circumscribed by the
confines of his own body and its day-to-day needs. He is unable to
leap across the boundary of the physical self or establish a relationship
with the potentially far-reaching creativity of his mind. It is only with
the outbreak of World War I that he and his fellow sanitarium
residents begin to look beyond themselves to the larger world, and
even more importantly, begin to experience a sense of connection with
their community.
Taylor describes the condition thus:
[O]ur normal understanding of self-realization presupposes
that some things are important beyond the self, that there
are some goods or purposes the furthering of which has
significance for us and which hence can provide the
significance a fulfilling life needs. Total and fully
consistent subjectivism would tend towards emptiness:
nothing would count as a fulfillment in a world in which
literally nothing was important but self-fulfillment."2
If, however, the autonomous individual decides, as he or she has
the freedom to do, not to act responsibly, then the question becomes
whether the state should act to enforce responsibility into the exercise
of free expression for the protection of society as a whole. This paper
argues that it must not. Since much of life and existence seems to
operate in a cyclical manner, it is safe to predict that at the point
where unabashed autonomy begins to gravely crush democratic
society, there naturally will be a counter-expression to this
phenomenon -- an affirmative expression of anti-selfishness -- which
again will nourish and rejuvenate the body polity. We have seen this
in our own American society after the prosperity-motivated 1950s,
during the communitarian late 1960s, and then again, briefly, during
111. THOMAS MANN, THE MAGIC MOUNTAIN (Harold Bloom ed. 1986).
112. TAYLOR, supra note 110, at 507.
HYBRID
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol4/iss1/8
THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
the late 1980s in response to the self-centered me-generation of the
late 1970s and early 1980s.
In conclusion, freedom of expression, regardless of one's culture,
regardless of one's country of citizenship, and regardless of national
borders, is an integral element of human dignity which itself is critical
to the human experience. Without freedom of speech one cannot truly
express the unique self that exists within each of us and that makes us
distinctly who we are. Furthermore, the dangers to each individual
that will result from court or government intervention outweigh the
benefits to society and indeed, by threatening individual autonomy and
free speech, ultimately such intervention will threaten the freedom of
the society itself. Likewise, non-self-regulated free expression creates
dangers for the community, but history has shown that certain built-in
regulatory mechanisms of human nature tend to counter these
destructive potentials. Therefore, freedom of expression must be free,
for the good of human beings as autonomous individuals and as
members of their community, and regardless of frontiers.
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